US Army War College

USAWC Press
Articles & Editorials
6-30-2016

Strategic Insights: Un-"Steady" State Operations: Redefining the
Approach to Phase Zero in a Complex World
Thomas R. Matelski

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/articles_editorials
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Matelski, Thomas R., "Strategic Insights: Un-"Steady" State Operations: Redefining the Approach to Phase
Zero in a Complex World" (2016). Articles & Editorials. 440.
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/articles_editorials/440

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Editorials by an authorized administrator of USAWC Press.

Strategic Insights: Un-"Steady" State
Operations: Redefining the Approach to
Phase Zero in a Complex World
June 20, 2016 | LTC Thomas R. Matelski

In recent months, there has been much discussion in the U.S. Department of Defense and
its subordinate components over the conduct of steady state operations, or as defined in
the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP), Phase Zero (Phase 0) operations.1 While
important to military planning, the current construct for Phase 0 is improperly framed.
Planning must be re-evaluated and redefined in order to reflect the changing nature of
conflict and the myriad hybrid challenges faced by the United States. These challenges
exist below the threshold of armed conflict and full spectrum conflict.2 Politically, they do
not necessitate full-scale U.S. military responses. Potential adversaries exploit the gap
between peace and armed conflict, leaving the United States with limited ability to
counteract them.
One case in point is how the United States currently deals with the unresolved
situation of Taiwan. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to takes political and
economic action, attempting to facilitate Taiwan’s reintegration with China. For example,
a recent article in the Naval War College Review points out that Chinese strategy in its
own Phase 0 operations is to make a concerted effort to “create the perception that the
PRC is locally too strong, [U.S.] allies are too few, [U.S.] economic and military costs are
too high, and victory is too difficult to risk coming to Taiwan’s aid.”3 China knits the
elements of national power into a Phase 0 campaign, resulting in considerable strategic
influence. Chinese military leaders implemented a long-term campaign to meet its
national objectives. As such, China is attempting to create future stability through
manageable instability over the short term. The result is U.S. operational planning that is

insufficient to meet the Chinese challenge, as well as a lack of a detailed and coordinated
U.S. strategic response. Our Chinese counterparts redefined the “steady" state by creating
an un-“steady” state.
Phase 0: Misunderstood, Maligned, and Under-Resourced
The concept for Phase 0 operations was not defined until 2006, when the Deputy
Commander of U.S. European Command, General Charles F. Wald, published “The Phase
Zero Campaign.” In the article, General Wald defined the doctrinal concept of Phase 0 as
consisting "of shaping operations that are continuous and adaptive. Its ultimate goal is to
promote stability and peace by building capacity in partner nations that enables them to
be cooperative, trained, and prepared to limit conflicts.”4 Since then, the JOPP has
included Phase 0 as a part of the five-phase planning construct.
Although Phase 0 has been a consistent part of the U.S. military operational construct
since 2006, its application has been uneven. Phase 0 is considered by military
commanders as an environment of relative peace consisting of a lack of conflict or low
level armed conflict. Their respective planning staffs consider it an opportunity for
security cooperation, future contingency planning, and setting the conditions for major
combat operations, if directed. The end result is that Phase 0 is misunderstood and
under–resourced as a way to build partner capacity or to set theater actions for future
conflicts. Further complicating the disjointed view of Phase 0 is the recently published
U.S. Army Operating Concept that fills the gap from strategy to doctrine. The concept
essentially tells the Army what to focus on while providing guideline on how to operate. It
proposes that future soldiers must be able to “prevent conflict, shape security
environments, and win wars.”5 Preventing conflict, ideally, would occur in Phase 0. While
the concept is sound, the Army’s vision for what it seeks to achieve in “preventing
conflict” is unclear.
Conflict prevention requires very sophisticated understanding of the root causes of
conflict and the impact of human interaction. For the U.S. military, it means the military
is not in charge — an ambassador is — and robust permission and coordination measures
are required. The need to redefine Phase 0 is about the need to develop a more
cooperative and coordinated approach to implementing U.S. foreign policy. The challenge
of operating in a Phase 0 construct is that it is neither “steady” nor easily “shapeable” as
defined in the military planning context. Phase 0 represents the most fluid and
unpredictable environment. Consequently, it consists of more numerous aspects for
consideration than that of traditional military planning.
A good example of this need is found in the Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) and
associated Country Action Plans (CAPs) produced by the geographic combatant
commands and their service component commands. The integration and synchronization

of efforts in the TCP represent current U.S. military activities in Phase 0. In any given
year, there are a multitude of operations, actions, and activities that occur in any
particular country. On paper, these can look overwhelming. They are based upon the
willingness of a country to partner and develop relationships with their U.S. military
service counterpart. But questions still remain: To what end are these activities taking
place? How do these activities complement or mutually support national objectives?
What U.S. national interest is being met? Do the activities address the complex nature of
the operating environment? Finally, how and who is evaluating the impact of the
activities?
Coordination and synchronization between the U.S. military and its international
partners take place once or twice a year in a repetitive cycle. Unfortunately, the all too
often responses from our international partners emphasize their frustration with these
programs and often sound something like: “Enough already!” or “How many more times
can we conduct the same program of instruction that we have repeatedly done over the
last 10 years?" or "We are tired of conducting instruction on intelligence preparation of
the battlefield.”6 In the spirit of partner engagement, the U.S. Army undertakes hundreds
of opportunities to address a complex operational environment. From the U.S.
perspective, military planners sometimes wrongly assume that presence in a given
country is an end unto itself, as the sum total of engagements do not address the
commander’s CAP. In some countries around the world, this is not the case, but
consistency remains a challenge in the operational and strategic contexts. In the same
country, sometimes in the same week, a host-nation partner force might engage with, for
example, Soldiers from a battalion of a regionally aligned force (RAF), others from the
U.S. Army National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP), others still from an
operational detachment of Special Forces, and perhaps even Soldiers from the logistics
Subject Matter Expert Exchange (SMEE) program. From the partner’s perspective, that is
a lot of activity. From the Army’s view, they are separate, distinct, and often unrelated
activities. These are generally not well-synchronized, and do not result in meaningful
outcomes.
Redefining the Phase 0 Approach for the Un-“Steady” State
The need to redefine the U.S. military’s approach to Phase 0 is not a push for more
authority or to change the authority of the chief of mission, as spelled out in National
Security Decision Directive (NSDD)-38. The need is to properly design a more nuanced
U.S. operational approach to a complex world. This is accomplished by redefining Phase 0
as a more comprehensive, synchronized approach to existing and future military
activities. The military needs to look at preventing conflict with the same rigor and
balance as it does in shaping the security environment and winning wars. Looking beyond
setting conditions in theater and building partner capacity, Phase 0 should focus instead

on conflict prevention and mitigation, which “is less costly (in both blood and treasure)
than the reactive approach to crisis . . . invest fewer resources in a pre-crisis situation to
avoid an exponentially larger expenditure later.”7
Redefining Phase 0 does not guarantee that the United States will be better prepared
to respond to actions by future strategic competitors. Framing the discussion in clearer
terms with appropriate actions will allow better synchronization of the disparate parts of
military activities. From the U.S. foreign policy standpoint, the military instrument of
national power will be more integrated and able to support diplomatic, informational,
and economic instruments. Ambassadors and geographic combatant commanders will be
able to provide national leaders with greater options for preventing crises and conflicts,
rather than responding to them.
Better Prepared for the “New Normal”
As the operational environment becomes more un-“steady” through the actions of
China (and other nations), U.S. military planning and execution need to be equally fluid
and adaptive. Critics in diplomatic and development circles will argue how a redefined
concept of Phase 0 is another step to increase military action or justify the need for
maintaining larger land forces and budgetary allocations. These critics believe the
military should be limited to armed conflict and major combat operations. “[Phase 0]
should only be applied in a linear, progressive manner once a military campaign
commences . . . or applied as a part of an on-going military campaign with forces engaged
in full spectrum operations.”8
Preventing war is not defined in either Joint or Army doctrine. Although appropriately
considered a part of the Army doctrinal concept of stability operations, preventing and
mitigating conflict is incorrectly associated with post-conflict operations, and viewed with
reluctance for planning and execution.
The U.S. military has the tools and abilities to execute a redefined Phase 0
appropriately. The efforts need to be systematic and conducted in an integrated, logical
fashion to respond to the complex challenges that face the United States. Until a
redefined concept incorporates elements of conflict prevention and mitigation coupled
with increased collaboration and coordination, the U.S. military will be steps behind
actors like China and Russia, who have already redefined their concepts and approaches
and are employing them successfully.
The un-“steady” state that defines the operational environment is difficult and
unpredictable, yet manageable. The changed environment necessitates rethinking
operational planning concepts. Redefining Phase 0 is an opportunity that should and
must not be overlooked.

ENDNOTES
1. Joint Operation Planning, Joint Publication 5-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense,
August 11, 2011, p. III-40.
2. The threshold of conflict requires an armed military response, but not necessarily major combat
operations, i.e., flexible deterrence operations or surgical airstrikes.
3. Scott D. McDonald, Brock Jones, and Jason M. Frazee, “Phase Zero: How China Exploits It, Why the
United States Does Not,” Naval War College Review, Providence, RI: Naval War College Press, Vol. 65,
Summer 2012, p. 130.
4. General Charles F. Wald, Deputy Commander, U.S. European Command, “The Phase Zero
Campaign,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, Iss. 43, 4th
Quarter 2006, p. 73.
5. Training and Doctrine Command, U.S. Department of Army, The U.S. Army Operating Concept:
Win in a Complex World, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, Fort Eustis, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command, October 31, 2014, p. 16.
6. Interviews with confidential partner-nation military forces, February 2012; and a former U.S.
division-level intelligence officer, conducted by the author July 2015.
7. Wald, p. 73.
8. Colonel Thomas M. Rhatican, Redefining Security Cooperation: New Limits on Phase Zero and
“Shaping,” Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 15, 2008, pp.
17-18.
*****
The views expressed in this Strategic Insights article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the official policy or position of the Daniel K. Inouye Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, the
Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This article is cleared for
public release; distribution is unlimited.
*****
Organizations interested in reprinting this or other SSI and USAWC Press articles should contact the
Editor for Production via e-mail at SSI_Publishing@conus.army.mil. All organizations granted this right
must include the following statement: “Reprinted with permission of the Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College.”

